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Abstract
As sponsored data with subsidized access cost gains popularity in industry, it is essential to understand
its impact on the Internet service market. We investigate the interplay among Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), Content Provider (CP) and End User (EU), where each player is selfish and wants to maximize its
own profit. In particular, we consider multi-ISP scenarios, in which the network connectivity between
the CP and the EU is jointly provided by multiple ISPs. We first model non-cooperative interaction
between the players as a four-stage Stackelberg game, and derive the optimal behaviors of each player in
equilibrium. Taking into account the transit price at intermediate ISP, we provide in-depth understanding
on the sponsoring strategies of CP. We then study the effect of cooperation between the ISPs to the
pricing structure and the traffic demand, and analyze their implications to the players. We further build
our revenue sharing model based on Shapley value mechanism, and show that the collaboration of the
ISPs can improve their total payoff with a higher social welfare.
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I Introduction
As demand for mobile data increases, Internet service providers (ISPs) are turning to new types of smart
data pricing to bring in additional revenue and to expand the capacity of their current network [1]. One
way to keep up funding such investment is content sponsorship. Content providers (CPs) split the cost of
transferring mobile data traffic, and sponsor the user’s access to the content by making direct payment to
the ISPs. For example, GS Shop, a Korea TV home shopping company, has partnered with SK Telecom
to sponsor data incurred from its application, so consumers are incentivized to continue browsing and
making purchases from their mobile devices without ringing up data charges [2]. Content sponsoring
may benefit all players in the market: the ISPs can generate more revenue with CP’s subsidies, and users
can enjoy free or low-cost access to certain services, which in turn increases the demand and attracts
more traffic, resulting in higher revenue of the CP.
There are several studies on content sponsoring despite of a short history. Most of the works either
focus on a simple model with a single ISP and a single CP interacting in a game theoretic setting, or
considers Quality-of-Service (QoS) prioritization and its implications for net neutrality [3, 4, 5, 6]. In
a two-sided market with a single ISP providing connection between CPs and EUs, profit maximization
of the players under sponsoring mobile data has been studied in [7, 8]. In [7], single monopolistic ISP
determines optimal price to charge the CPs and the EUs, while the authors in [8] study the contractual
relationship between the CPs and the ISP under a similar model. Nevertheless, none of them consider
the interaction between multiple ISPs. Although the authors in [9] proposes a model with a transit
ISP and a user-facing ISP, their understanding of the interaction between these non-cooperative ISPs
are limited to the environments without content sponsoring. Other works, e.g. [10, 11], have analyzed
content sponsorship from the economic point of view. They examine the implications of sponsored data
on the CPs and the EUs, and identify how sponsored data influence the CP inequality.
In many Internet markets, there are multiple ISPs that cooperate to provide end-to-end connectiv-
ity service between the CPs and the EUs, in which case the assumption of a single representative ISP
no longer holds. Since each ISP aims to maximize its own profit, the establishment of interconnec-
tion among multiple ISPs is a thorough process that depends on specific profit sharing/inter-charging
arrangements.
As the most commercial traffic originates from the CPs and terminates at the EUs, some ISPs posi-
tioned on the middle of the traffic delivery chain will have more power and request a transit-price. An
ISP serving a large population of users might have a dominant influence in determining the transit price
paid by other relatively weak ISPs for traffic delivery. For an example, a large entertainment company
Netflix directly uses the service provided by ISPs such as Level 3, which is connected with residential
broadband ISPs like Comcast to get access to the customers [12]. Level 3 charges Netflix and Comcast
charges the users. Netflix may partially or fully sponsor its traffic, which is likely to increase the amount
of traffic through both ISPs. Due to high traffic volume, the access ISP (Comcast) may require additional
transit price for traffic delivery, which will impact on the pricing decision at Level 3 and subsequently
on the sponsoring decision at Netflix. In this work, we are interested in the dynamics between the play-
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ers with focus on content sponsoring and transit pricing. To this end, we study the interplay among
two Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Content Provider (CP), and End User (EU), where each player
selfishly maximizes its own profit. We model this non-cooperative interaction between ISP1, ISP2, CP,
and EU as a four-stage Stackelberg game. Specifically, in our model, we assume that the EU-facing ISP
has a dominant power and can be considered as the game leader who decides the transit cost preceding
the choice of the follower ISP. We aim to understand the behaviors of the players in non-cooperative
equilibrium and their decisions to maximize their own utility. Also we investigate the responses of the
players when the ISPs cooperate with each other. We show that, under collaboration with appropriate
revenue sharing, each ISP can achieve a higher revenue while improving the social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the basic system model in Section II,
and investigate the strategies of the CP, the EU, and the ISPs to maximize their utility in Section III.
We also study the effect of collaboration and build our revenue sharing model based on Shapley value
mechanism in Section IV and V, respectively. Numerical results are presented in Section VI, followed
by the conclusion and future work in Section VII.
II Two-ISP Pricing Model
We consider an Internet market model with one CP and two ISPs as shown in Figure 1. Two intercon-
nected ISPs have their own cost structures and each provides connectivity to either the CP or the EU.
The CP-facing ISP (ISP1) obtains its profits by directly charging the CP (CP) by pcp per unit traffic
while the EU-facing ISP (ISP2) charges the EU (EU) by peu per unit traffic. Further ISP2 charges ISP1
with transit-price ptr for traffic delivery. CP can sponsor the cost of EU by s · peu per unit traffic with
s ∈ [0,1]. We assume that the sponsored amount is paid to ISP1 and then indirectly delivered to ISP2
through the transit price, which allows both ISPs to benefit from the sponsoring. Let m1 and m2 denote
the marginal costs of traffic delivery for ISP1 and ISP2, respectively. We denote x as the traffic amount
of flow between CP and EU .
Figure 1: Two-sided Internet market.
We assume that the players in this non-cooperative game make decisions in four stages as follows:
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1. ISP2 sets prices peu and ptr to charge EU and ISP1, respectively.
2. ISP1 determines the optimal value of pcp to charge CP.
3. CP decides how much content to sponsor, i.e., the value of s.
4. The traffic volume is decided by both EU and CP.
Each player selfishly maximizes its own profit subject to the others’ decisions. We model this non-
cooperative interaction as a four-stage Stackelberg game and use the backward induction method to find
optimal strategy of each player.
Let us define the utility of EU by the multiplication of a scaling factor σeu ≥ 0 and a utility-level
function. The utility represents user’s desire to obtain traffic. We assume a concave and non-decreasing
function ueu(x) with decreasing marginal satisfaction, i.e., ueu(x) = x
1−αeu
1−αeu with parameter αeu ∈ (0,1).
Given unit price peu that ISP2 charges user, EU will maximize its utility minus the payment by solving
(EU−P) max
x
σeu ·ueu(x)− (1− s) · x · peu,
s.t. x≥ 0, (1)
where s ∈ [0,1] denotes the sponsored percentage, and (1− s) · x · peu denotes the payment of EU to
ISP2. The solution x∗eu to (1) can be obtained as x∗eu(s, peu) = (
σeu
(1−s)peu )
1
αeu .
Similarly, we model the behavior of CP. The utility of CP is given by σcpucp(x), where σcp ≥ 0
is a scaling factor (e.g., the popularity of the content) and ucp(x) is a concave utility-level function
ucp(x) = x
1−αcp
1−αcp with parameter αcp ∈ (0,1). CP will maximize its payoff by solving
(CP−P) max
x,s
σcp ·ucp(x)− s · x · peu− x · pcp,
s.t. x≥ 0 and 0≤ s≤ 1. (2)
In the objective, the first term denotes its utility, the second term denotes the cost due to sponsorship,
and the third term is from the network usage cost to ISP1. Given s, pcp, and peu, it can be easily shown
that the optimal amount of traffic for CP is x∗cp(s, pcp, peu) = (
σcp
speu+pcp
)
1
αcp .
Since ISP1 obtains its revenue from charging CP, it decides the optimal value of pcp to maximize its
total profit as
(ISP1−P) max
pcp
(pcp+ s∗ · peu− ptr−m1) · x∗(pcp, peu),
s.t. pcp ≥ 0, (3)
where m1 is the marginal cost for traffic delivery and thus pcp+ s∗ · peu− ptr−m1 is the net-gain of ISP1
per unit traffic.
ISP2 obtains its revenue from charging ISP1 with transit-price ptr and charging EU with traffic-price
peu. Therefore, in order to maximize its total profit, it will solve
(ISP2−P) max
peu,ptr
((1− s∗) · peu+ ptr−m2) · x∗(pcp, peu),
s.t. peu ≥ 0 and ptr ≥ 0, (4)
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where m2 is the marginal cost for traffic delivery.
Through the sequential decision, we investigate the interactions of the players described in (1), (2),
(3), (4), and find the optimal strategies for pricing and sponsoring.
III Strategies for Utility Maximization
In this section, we sequentially find the optimal strategies of CP, ISP1, and ISP2 by exploiting the back-
ward induction.
3.1 Sponsoring of Content Provider (CP)
Note that each solution to (1) and (2) results in user-side traffic demand x∗eu and CP-side traffic amount
x∗cp, respectively, and the actual traffic amount x∗ between CP and EU will be determined by their
minimum, i.e., x∗ = min{x∗cp,x∗eu}. In general x∗eu 6= x∗cp. For instance, a certain website may restrict the
number of simultaneous on-line clients, which implies x∗cp ≤ x∗eu.
Suppose that peu and pcp are given. The actual traffic x∗(s) will be determined by the sponsoring
rate s, and CP will decide its optimal sponsored percentage s∗ by solving the following problem:
(CP−P) max
s
σcp ·ucp(x∗(s))− s · x∗(s) · peu− x∗(s) · pcp,
s.t. 0≤ s≤ 1. (5)
We assume αeu = αcp = α ∈ (0,1), i.e., EU and CP utility components have the same utility shape.
This assumption is reasonable in the scenarios where CP makes its pricing decision according to the
user response. On the other hand, the scaling factors σeu and σcp of EU and CP can be quite different.
The sponsoring behavior will be affected by whether the traffic volume is constrained by EU or CP. If
x∗eu≤ x∗cp, we have s≤ σcp peu−σeu pcp(σeu+σcp)peu and x∗= x∗eu. Similarly, if x∗eu≥ x∗cp, we have s≥max(
σcp peu−σeu pcp
(σeu+σcp)peu ,0)
and x∗ = x∗cp. We consider each case.
Case i) When x∗ = x∗cp. The profit of the CP can be written as
V (s) = σcp ·ucp(x∗cp(s))− s · x∗cp(s) · peu− x∗cp(s) · pcp. (6)
By substituting x∗cp(s, pcp, peu) = (
σcp
speu+pcp
)
1
α into (6), it can be easily shown that V (s) is a decreasing
function of s, and we have the optimal value s∗ = max(σcp peu−σeu pcp(σeu+σcp)peu ,0). Thus, the traffic amount and the
sponsoring rate will be
(x∗cp,s
∗) =
((
σcp
pcp
)
1
α , 0), i f σcpσeu ≤
pcp
peu
,
((
σcp+σeu
pcp+peu
)
1
α ,
σcp peu−σeu pcp
(σeu+σcp)peu ), i f
σcp
σeu >
pcp
peu
.
(7)
The maximum profit of CP is given as
V ∗(x∗cp,s
∗) =

α(σcp)
1
α
1−α (pcp)
1− 1α , i f σcpσeu ≤
pcp
peu
,
ασcp
1−α (
peu+pcp
σeu+σcp )
1− 1α , i f σcpσeu >
pcp
peu
.
(8)
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Case ii) When x∗ = x∗eu. In this case, we have s ≤ σcp peu−σeu pcp(σeu+σcp)peu , x∗eu(s, peu) = (
σeu
(1−s)peu )
1
α and σcpσeu >
pcp
peu
.
CP will optimize its sponsorship percentage by solving
max
σcp( σeupeu )
1
α −1
1−α (1− s)1−
1
α − (speu+pcp)(
σeu
peu
)
1
α
(1−s) 1α
,
s.t. 0≤ s≤ σcp peu−σeu pcp(σeu+σcp)peu ,
σcp
σeu >
pcp
peu
. (9)
From the first order condition, the optimal data rate x∗ and the optimal sponsoring rate s∗ can be obtained
as
(x∗eu,s
∗) =

((σeupeu )
1
α , 0), i f pcppeu <
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
,
((
σcp+(1−α)σeu
pcp+peu
)
1
α ,
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
), i f σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
,
(10)
and the maximum profit of CP is
V ∗(x∗eu,s
∗) =

(σeupeu )
1
α [
σcp peu
(1−α)σeu − pcp] i f
pcp
peu
<
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
,
α(pcp+peu)
1−α (
σcp+(1−α)σeu
pcp+peu
)
1
α i f σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
.
(11)
To summarize, we have
(i) If σcpσeu ≤
pcp
peu
,
then (x∗,s∗) = (x∗cp,0) and V ∗(x∗cp,s∗) =
α(σcp)
1
α
1−α (pcp)
1− 1α .
(ii) If σcpσeu >
pcp
peu
and x∗ = x∗cp,
then (x∗,s∗) = (x∗cp,max(
σcp peu−σeu pcp
(σeu+σcp)peu ,0)) and V
∗(x∗cp,s∗) =
ασcp
1−α (
peu+pcp
σeu+σcp )
1− 1α .
(iii) If σcpσeu >
pcp
peu
, x∗ = x∗eu, and
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
,
then (x∗,s∗) = (x∗eu,0) and V ∗(x∗eu,s∗) = (
σeu
peu
)
1
α [
σcp peu
(1−α)σeu − pcp].
(iv) If σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
and x∗ = x∗eu,
then (x∗,s∗) = (x∗eu,
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
) and V ∗(x∗eu,s∗) =
α(pcp+peu)
1−α (
σcp+(1−α)σeu
pcp+peu
)
1
α .
From the two-case response of CP, we can obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Given prices pcp and peu, the optimal sponsorship rate s∗ of the CP is
case 1) if σcpσeu ≤
pcp
peu
, s∗ = 0,
case 2) if pcppeu <
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
, s∗ = 0,
case 3) if σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
, s∗ =
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
.
(12)
Proof For case 1, the maximum available profit of CP can be easily obtained as V ∗(x∗cp,s∗)=
α(σcp)
1
α
1−α (pcp)
1− 1α
from (8).
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For σcpσeu >
pcp
peu
, the CP will choose the largest one among available profits of V ∗(x∗cp,s∗) and V ∗(x∗eu,s∗),
given in (8) and (11), respectively. Let σ = σcpσeu and p =
pcp
peu
. We decompose it into two subcases as be-
low.
1) When p < σ ≤ α+ p, each profit function can be written as
V ∗(x∗cp,s
∗) = (σeu)
1
α (peu)1−
1
α
(1−α) (
1+p
1+σ )(
1+p
1+σ )
− 1α ασ ,
V ∗(x∗eu,s
∗) = (σeu)
1
α (peu)1−
1
α
(1−α) (σ − (1−α)p).
Consider the ratio V
∗(x∗eu,s∗)
V ∗(x∗cp,s∗)
. By using the generalized form of Bernoulli’s inequality (1+ x)r ≥ 1+ rx
for r ≤ 0 or r ≥ 1 and x >−1, we can obtain
V ∗(x∗eu,s∗)
V ∗(x∗cp,s∗)
≥ (σ−(1−α)pασ )(1+σ1+p )(1+ p−σ(1+σ)α ) = 1+ (1−α)(σ−p)(p+α−σ)σα2(1+p) .
Hence, if p < σ ≤ α+ p, we have V ∗(x∗eu,s∗)V ∗(x∗cp,s∗) ≥ 1, implying x
∗ = x∗eu and s∗ = 0 from (10)
2) When σ > α+ p, we have
V ∗(x∗cp,s
∗) = ( α1−α )(peu+ pcp)
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α (σ)(1+σ)
1
α−1,
V ∗(x∗eu,s
∗) = ( α1−α )(peu+ pcp)
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α (1+σ −α) 1α .
Again we consider the ratio V
∗(x∗eu,s∗)
V ∗(x∗cp,s∗)
= 1+σσ (1− α1+σ )
1
α . Applying the generalized form of Bernoulli’s
inequality, we have V
∗(x∗eu,s∗)
V ∗(x∗cp,s∗)
≥ 1+σσ (1− 11+σ ) = 1, and thus we have x∗ = x∗eu and s∗ =
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
from
(10).
According to Proposition 1, CP has no incentive to invest in sponsored data plan when σcpσeu ≤α+
pcp
peu
.
On the other hand, when σcpσeu > α +
pcp
peu
, CP will invest in sponsoring as in (10). The data rate under
sponsoring will be
case 1) if σcpσeu ≤
pcp
peu
, x∗(pcp, peu) = (
σcp
pcp
)
1
α ,
case 2) if pcppeu <
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
, x∗(pcp, peu) = (σeupeu )
1
α ,
case 3) if σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
, x∗(pcp, peu) = (
σcp+(1−α)σeu
pcp+peu
)
1
α .
(13)
3.2 Utility Maximization of ISP1
ISP1 also tries to maximize its total profit in each region specified in (13). We obtain the optimal response
of ISP1 in each case.
Case 1) When x∗ = (σcppcp )
1
α and s∗ = 0. From (3), ISP1 maximizes (pcp− ptr−m1) · (σcppcp )
1
α subject to
σcp
σeu · peu ≤ pcp. The best response p∗cp of ISP1 can be easily obtained as p∗cp =
ptr+m1
1−α . The maximum
profit P∗1 is
P∗1 = [
α(m1+m2)
(1−α) · σ1+σ(1−α) ] · (
σcp(1−α)(1+σ(1−α))
σ(m1+m2) )
1
α ,
where σ = σcpσeu .
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Case 2) When x∗ = (σeupeu )
1
α and s∗ = 0. From (3), ISP1 has the objective of max
pcp≥0
(pcp− ptr−m1) ·
(σeupeu )
1
α subject to pcppeu −
σcp
σeu ≤ 0 and
σcp
σeu −α −
pcp
peu
≤ 0. From the constraints, we have pcp ∈ [(σcpσeu −
α)peu,
σcp
σeu peu]. Note that since the objective is an increasing function of pcp, we set the largest pcp =
σcp
σeu · peu for the optimal solution, which gives us maximum utility P∗1 = (
σcp
σeu · peu− ptr−m1) ·(
σeu
peu
)
1
α . By
differentiating it with respect to peu, we can find p∗eu =
σeu
σcp · (
ptr+m1
1−α ) that maximizes P
∗
1 , which results in
the optimal p∗cp =
ptr+m1
1−α . The maximum profit is
P∗1 = [
α(m1+m2)
(1−α) · σ1+σ(1−α) ] · (σeu(1−α)(1+σ(1−α))(m1+m2) )
1
α .
Case 3) When x∗ = (σcp+(1−α)σeupcp+peu )
1
α and s∗ =
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
. The problem can be rewritten as max
pcp≥0
(pcp +
s∗peu− ptr−m1) · (σcp+(1−α)σeupcp+peu )
1
α , subject to pcp ≤ (σcpσeu −α)peu. From the first order condition, we can
obtain the optimal price p∗cp =
(k+1)(ptr+m1)
k(1−α) − peu, where k =
σcp
σeu −α. The maximum profit is
P∗1 = α(
m1+m2
1−α )
1− 1α · (σcp+(1−α)σeu) 1α · (1+k(1−α)1+k )
1
α · k1+k(1−α) .
3.3 Utility Maximization of ISP2
For the behaviors of ISP2, we also consider the three cases of (13) and find the best strategy of ISP2 for
each case.
Case 1) When x∗(p∗cp, peu) = (
σcp
p∗cp
)
1
α and s∗ = 0. We already have p∗cp =
ptr+m1
1−α . From (4) and (13), the
ISP2 determines its prices peu and ptr by solving max
peu≥0,ptr≥0
((1− s∗) · peu+ ptr−m2) · (σcpp∗cp )
1
α , subject to
σcp
σeu −
p∗cp
peu
≤ 0.
Let P denote the objective function. From the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we have
∂P
∂ peu = 0,
∂P
∂ ptr = 0, and λ · [
σcp
σeu −
p∗cp
peu
] = 0. By solving these equations, we have the optimal prices
p∗eu =
(m1+m2)
(1−α)(1+(k+α)(1−α)) and p
∗
tr =
(k+α)(m1+m2)
(1+(k+α)(1−α)) −m1,
at which the maximum profit P∗2 is
P∗2 = [
α(m1+m2)
(1−α) ](
σcp(1−α)(1+(k+α)(1−α))
(k+α)(m1+m2) )
1
α ,
where k = σcpσeu −α .
Case 2) When x∗(p∗cp, peu) = (
σeu
peu
)
1
α and s∗ = 0. In this case, we have p∗cp =
ptr+m1
1−α . From (4) and
(13), the ISP2 determines its prices by solving max
peu≥0,ptr≥0
((1− s∗) · peu+ ptr−m2) · (σeupeu )
1
α , subject to
p∗cp
peu
− σcpσeu ≤ 0 and
σcp
σeu −α−
p∗cp
peu
≤ 0.
From the KKT conditions, we have ∂P∂ peu = 0,
∂P
∂ ptr = 0, λ1 ·(
p∗cp
peu
− σcpσeu )= 0 and λ2 ·(
σcp
σeu −α−
p∗cp
peu
)= 0,
where λi ≥ 0, pcp ≥ 0, and peu ≥ 0. There are three possible subcases: i) λ1 = 0, λ2 6= 0, ii) λ1 6= 0,
λ2 = 0, iii) λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. The solution to each subcase can be obtained as follows.
i) When λ1 = 0 and λ2 6= 0, the optimal prices will be
p∗eu =
m1+m2
(1−α)(1+k(1−α)) and p
∗
tr =
k(m1+m2)
1+k(1−α) −m1,
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Scenario CP: s∗ ISP 1: p∗cp ISP 2: p∗eu , p∗tr
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
s∗ = 0 p∗cp =
ptr+m1
1−α
p∗eu =
(m1+m2)
(1−α)(1+(k+α)(1−α)) ,
p∗tr =
(k+α)(m1+m2)
(1+(k+α)(1−α)) −m1
σcp
σeu > α+
pcp
peu
s∗ =
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
p∗cp =
(k+1)(ptr+m1)
k(1−α) − peu
p∗eu =
(m1+m2)
(1−α)(1+k(1−α)) ,
p∗tr =
k(m1+m2)
(1+k(1−α)) −m1
Table 1: Optimal sponsoring rate and prices.
where k = σcpσeu −α , and we have the maximum profit
P∗λ1 = [
α(m1+m2)
(1−α) ](
(σcp−σeuα)(1−α)2+σeu(1−α)
m1+m2
)
1
α .
ii) When λ1 6= 0 and λ2 = 0, the optimal prices will be
p∗eu =
(m1+m2)
(1−α)(1+(k+α)(1−α)) and p
∗
tr =
(k+α)(m1+m2)
(1+(k+α)(1−α)) −m1,
and the maximum profit
P∗λ2 =
α(m1+m2)
(1−α) (
σcp(1−α)2+σeu(1−α)
m1+m2
)
1
α .
iii) When λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0, the two inequality constraints should be an active constraint (i.e., the
equalities hold). However, it is not possible to satisfy both equalities, and hence, this case is infeasible.
From P∗λ2 > P
∗
λ1 , we should have λ2 = 0 and the best response of the ISP2 is that of ii), which also
equals the result of Case 1.
Case 3) In this case, we have the optimal sponsoring rate s∗ =
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
and the traffic demand is
x∗(p∗cp, peu) = (
σcp+(1−α)σeu
pcp+peu
)
1
α . As shown in Section 3.2, the best-response p∗cp of ISP1 is
(k+1)(ptr+m1)
k(1−α) −
peu. From (4) and (13), ISP2 determines its prices by solving max
peu≥0,ptr≥0
((1−s∗)· peu+ ptr−m2)·(σcp+(1−α)σeup∗cp+peu )
1
α ,
subject to p
∗
cp
peu
+α− σcpσeu ≤ 0.
From the KKT conditions, we have ∂P∂ peu = 0,
∂P
∂ ptr = 0, and λ · [
p∗cp
peu
+α − σcpσeu ] = 0. By solving the
equations, we can obtain without difficulty that
p∗eu =
(m1+m2)
(1−α)(1+k(1−α)) and p
∗
tr =
k(m1+m2)
(1+k(1−α)) −m1.
The maximum profit P∗2 will be
P∗2 = α(
m1+m2
1−α )
1− 1α (σcp+(1−α)σeu) 1α (1+k(1−α)1+k )
1
α .
To sum up, by investigating the structure of the proposed game, we derived the optimal responses
of the EU, the CP, and two ISPs in a non-cooperative equilibrium. The Table 1 summarizes the best
response of each player when they maximize their utility in a greedy manner. We further investigate the
players’ behaviors when the two ISPs cooperate.
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IV Cooperative Model
In this section, we study the effect of collaboration to the pricing structure and the traffic demand be-
tween CP and EU, and analyze their implications for the total payoff of ISPs. When ISP1 and ISP2
collaborate to deliver traffic from CP to EU, we can consider them as one ISP who obtains its revenue
from charging CP by pcp and EU by peu. The two ISPs are in peering with no transit-cost: neither party
pays the other in association with the exchange of traffic. Instead, they need to fairly redistribute the
total revenue according to their marginal contributions. We will use Shapley value mechanism for this
purpose.
We first obtain the total revenue of the ISPs. The utility maximization of the ISPs can be written as
(ISP−P) max
pcp,peu
(pcp+ peu−m1−m2) · x∗(pcp, peu),
s.t. pcp ≥ 0 and peu ≥ 0. (14)
Given unit price peu that ISP charges user, EU will maximize its utility minus the payment by solving
(EU−P) max
x
σeu ·ueu(x)− (1− s) · x · peu,
s.t. x≥ 0, (15)
where s ∈ [0,1] denotes the sponsored percentage, and (1−s) ·x · peu denotes the payment of EU to ISP.
The solution x∗eu to (2) can be obtained as x∗eu(s, peu) = (
σeu
(1−s)peu )
1
αeu .
Similarly, CP will maximize its payoff by solving
(CP−P) max
x,s
σcp ·ucp(x)− s · x · peu− x · pcp,
s.t. x≥ 0 and 0≤ s≤ 1, (16)
where the first term denotes its utility, the second term denotes the cost due to sponsorship, and the third
term is from the network usage cost to ISP. Given s, pcp, and peu, it can be easily shown that the optimal
amount of traffic for CP is x∗cp(s, pcp, peu) = (
σcp
speu+pcp
)
1
αcp .
Since the actual traffic amount x∗ between CP and EU will be determined by their minimum, i.e.,
x∗ = min{x∗cp,x∗eu}, we can obtain the optimal sponsorship rate s∗ and the data rate under sponsoring by
considering three cases as before. We omit the detailed derivation and provide the result as
case 1) if σcpσeu ≤
pcp
peu
, (x∗,s∗) = ((σcppcp )
1
α , 0),
case 2) if pcppeu <
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
, (x∗,s∗) = ((σeupeu )
1
α , 0),
case 3) if σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
, (x∗,s∗) = ((σcp+(1−α)σeupcp+peu )
1
α ,
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
).
(17)
ISPs cooperate and try to maximize their total profit in each region specified in (17). We obtain the
optimal response of ISPs in each case.
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Case 1) When x∗(pcp, peu) = (
σcp
pcp
)
1
α and s∗ = 0. From (14) and (17), the coalition-ISP determines its
prices peu and pcp by maximizing (pcp+ peu−m1−m2) · (σcppcp )
1
α , subject to σcpσeu −
pcp
peu
≤ 0, peu ≥ 0, and
pcp ≥ 0.
Let P denote the objective function. From the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we have
∂P
∂ peu = 0,
∂P
∂ pcp = 0, and λ · [
σcp
σeu −
pcp
peu
] = 0. By solving these equations, it is not difficulty to obtain the
optimal prices of
p∗∗eu =
σeu(m1+m2)
(1−α)(σcp+σeu) and p
∗∗
cp =
σcp(m1+m2)
(1−α)(σcp+σeu) , (18)
at which the maximum profit P∗∗ equals
P∗∗ = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σcp+σeu)
1
α .
Case 2) When x∗(pcp, peu) = (σeupeu )
1
α and s∗ = 0. From (14) and (17), the coalition-ISP determines its
prices by solving max
peu≥0,pcp≥0
(pcp+ peu−m1−m2) · (σeupeu )
1
α , subject to pcppeu ≤
σcp
σeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
.
From the KKT conditions, we have ∂P∂ peu = 0,
∂P
∂ pcp = 0, λ1 ·(
pcp
peu
− σcpσeu )= 0 and λ2 ·(
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
)= 0,
where λi≥ 0, pcp≥ 0, and peu≥ 0. There are four possible subcases: i) λ1 = 0, λ2 6= 0, ii) λ1 6= 0, λ2 = 0,
iii) λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0, iv) λ1 6= 0 and λ2 6= 0.
i) When λ1 = 0 and λ2 6= 0, the optimal prices will be
p∗∗eu =
m1+m2
(1−α)(1+k) and p
∗∗
cp =
k(m1+m2)
(1−α)(1+k) ,
where k = σcpσeu −α , and we have the maximum profit
P∗∗λ1 = α(
m1+m2
1−α )
1− 1α (σcp+(1−α)σeu) 1α .
ii) When λ1 6= 0 and λ2 = 0, the optimal prices will be
p∗∗eu =
σeu(m1+m2)
(1−α)(σcp+σeu) and p
∗∗
cp =
σcp(m1+m2)
(1−α)(σcp+σeu) , (19)
and the maximum profit P∗∗λ2 = α(
m1+m2
1−α )
1− 1α (σcp+σeu)
1
α .
iii) When λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0, the two inequality constraints of
pcp
peu
≤ σcpσeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
should be an active
constraint (i.e., the equalities hold). However, it is not possible to satisfy both equalities, and hence, it is
infeasible.
iv) Similarly, when λ1 6= 0 and λ2 6= 0, we cannot find a feasible solution for any α > 0.
From P∗∗λ2 > P
∗∗
λ1 , we should have λ2 = 0 and the best response of the ISPs is (19), which is exactly
the same as in (18).
Case 3) In this case, we have the optimal sponsoring rate s∗ =
σcp
σeu −α−
pcp
peu
σcp
σeu +1−α
and the traffic demand is
x∗(pcp, peu)= (
σcp+(1−α)σeu
pcp+peu
)
1
α . From (14) and (17), ISPs determine their prices by solving max
peu≥0,pcp≥0
(pcp+
peu−m1−m2) ·(σcp+(1−α)σeupcp+peu )
1
α , subject to pcppeu +α−
σcp
σeu ≤ 0. From the KKT conditions, we have ∂P∂ peu = 0,
∂P
∂ pcp = 0, and λ · [
pcp
peu
+α− σcpσeu ] = 0. By solving the equations, we can obtain without difficulty that
p∗∗eu =
(m1+m2)
(1−α)(k+1) and p
∗∗
cp =
k(m1+m2)
(1−α)(k+1) ,
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where k = σcpσeu −α , with the maximum profit as
P∗∗ = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σcp+(1−α)σeu) 1α .
Comparing the results with those in non-cooperative scenarios, we can obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2 The ISPs obtain higher total payoff when they collaborate.
P∗∗ ≥ P∗T , (20)
where P∗T denotes the total profit in non-cooperative case, i.e., P
∗
T = P
∗
1 +P
∗
2 .
Proof We consider each case as before.
For Case 1. From our previous results for non-cooperative game, we know that the maximum profits
of ISP1 and ISP2 are [
α(m1+m2)
(1−α) · σ1+σ(1−α) ](
σcp(1−α)(1+σ(1−α))
σ(m1+m2) )
1
α and [α(m1+m2)(1−α) ] · (
σcp(1−α)(1+σ(1−α))
σ(m1+m2) )
1
α ,
respectively, where σ = σcpσeu . Hence, the total profit is
P∗T = [
α(m1+m2)
(1−α) · 1+σ+σ(1−α)1+σ(1−α) ](
σcp(1−α)(1+σ(1−α))
σ(m1+m2) )
1
α .
We can rewrite the total profits of ISPs for each non-cooperative and cooperative case as
P∗T = α(
m1+m2
1−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α (1+σ(1−α)) 1α (1+σ+σ(1−α)1+σ(1−α) ),
P∗∗ = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α (1+σ)
1
α .
Considering the ratio P
∗∗
P∗T
= ( 1+σ1+σ−ασ )
1
α ( 1+σ−ασ1+σ+σ−ασ ) and applying the generalized form of Bernoulli’s
inequality, we obtain
P∗∗
P∗T
≥ (1+ σ1+σ−ασ )( 1+σ−ασ1+σ+σ−ασ ) = 1,
which immediately implies P∗∗ ≥ P∗T .
For Case 2, we have the same total profits P∗T and P
∗∗ as in Case 1. Thus, we have P∗∗ ≥ P∗T .
For Case 3, from Section 3.2 and 3.3, The total profits in non-cooperative and cooperative cases can
be written as
P∗T = α(
m1+m2
1−α )
1− 1α (σcp+(1−α)σeu) 1α (1+k(1−α)1+k )
1
α
k+1+k(1−α)
1+k(1−α) ,
P∗∗ = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σcp+(1−α)σeu) 1α ,
where k = σcpσeu −α and σ =
σcp
σeu . Again we apply Bernoulli’s inequality to
P∗∗
P∗T
= ( 1+k1+k(1−α))
1
α
1+k(1−α)
k+1+k(1−α) ,
and obtain
P∗∗
P∗T
≥
(
1+ k1+k(1−α)
)
· 1+k(1−α)k+1+k(1−α) = 1.
This completes the proof, and in all three cases, ISPs obtain a higher total payoff when they collaborate.
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V Shapley Revenue Distribution
One remaining task under the collaboration is how to distribute the payoff P∗∗ to each ISP. To this end,
we apply Shapley value mechanism.
Suppose that a network consists of a set of ISPs denoted as N with N = |N|. Any nonempty subset
S ⊆ N is a coalition of ISPs. For any coalition S,P(S) denotes the profit (i.e., revenue minus cost)
generated by the sub-network formed by the set of ISPs S. We define the marginal contribution of ISPi
to a coalition S⊆ N\{i} as4i(S) = P(S∪{i})−P(S). The Shapley value φ is defined by
φi =
1
N! ∑pi∈Π
4i(S(pi, i)) ∀i ∈ N, (21)
where Π is the set of all N! orderings of N and S(pi, i) is the set of players preceding i in the ordering
pi [13, 14]. The Shapley value depends only on the values {P(S) : S ⊆ N} and satisfies desirable ef-
ficiency and fairness properties [15]. Revenue sharing model based on the Shapley value belongs to a
cooperation-based game theory, and the mechanism has a capacity to divide the revenue fairly between
the involved parties [16, 17].
In our model, we have N = {1,2}, and ISP1 and ISP2 receive their Shapley value, which can be
obtained as
φ1 = 12 P({1})+ 12 [P({1,2})−P({2})],
φ2 = 12 P({2})+ 12 [P({1,2})−P({1})],
(22)
where P({1,2}) = φ1+φ2 is the total profit under collaboration, and P({1}) = P∗1 and P({2}) = P∗2 are
the profit of ISP1 and ISP2 in non-cooperative case, respectively.
Recall that letting A = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α , σ = σcpσeu and k =
σcp
σeu −α , we have
if σcpσeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
, P∗1 = A(1+σ(1−α))
1
α ( σ1+σ(1−α)),
P∗2 = A(1+σ(1−α))
1
α ,
if σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
, P∗1 = A(1+ k(1−α))
1
α ( k1+k(1−α)),
P∗2 = A(1+ k(1−α))
1
α .
(23)
From the results in Section IV, we can also obtain the total payoff P({1,2}) under cooperation as
if σcpσeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
, (Cases 1 & 2)
P({1,2}) = α(m1+m21−α )1−
1
α (σeu)
1
α (1+σ)
1
α ,
if σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
, (Case 3)
P({1,2}) = α(m1+m21−α )1−
1
α (σcp+(1−α)σeu) 1α .
(24)
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From (22), we obtain the Shapley value for ISP1 and ISP2 as
if σcpσeu ≤ α+
pcp
peu
, (Cases 1 & 2)
φ1 = A[(1+σ)
1
α − (1+σ(1−α)) 1α 1−ασ1+σ(1−α) ],
φ2 = A[(1+σ)
1
α +(1+σ(1−α)) 1α 1−ασ1+σ(1−α) ],
if σcpσeu > α+
pcp
peu
, (Case 3)
φ1 = A[(σ +1−α) 1α − (1+ k(1−α)) 1α 1−αk1+k(1−α) ],
φ2 = A[(σ +1−α) 1α +(1+ k(1−α)) 1α 1−αk1+k(1−α) ].
(25)
The following proposition shows that the collaboration with revenue sharing of Shapley mechanism
improves the profit of each ISP.
Proposition 3 The revenue sharing mechanism assures that an ISPi’s revenue portion at least equals to
the revenue gained without collaboration, i.e.
φi ≥ P({i}) (26)
Proof For case 1, according to a Shapley value based revenue sharing scheme defined in Equation (25),
ISP1 receives φ1 = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α [(1+σ)
1
α − (1+σ(1−α)) 1α 1−ασ1+σ(1−α) ] portion of the total revenue
and from Equation (23) we know the maximum profit of ISP1 obtained without collaboration is P({1})=
α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α [(1+σ(1−α)) 1α ( σ1+σ(1−α))]. We consider the ratio φ1P({1}) = 12 [ (1+σ)
1
α (1+σ(1−α))
σ(1+σ(1−α)) 1α
−
1−ασ
σ ] =
1
2 [(
1+σ−ασ+ασ
1+σ−ασ )
1
α
(1+σ(1−α))
σ − 1−ασσ ]. By using the generalized form of Bernoulli’s inequality
(1+ x)r ≥ 1+ rx for r ≤ 0 or r ≥ 1 and x >−1, we can obtain
φ1
P({1}) ≥ 12 [(1+ σ1+σ−ασ )(1+σ(1−α)σ )− 1−ασσ ] = 12 [2σσ ] = 1.
Similarly, for case 1, ISP2’s profits in cooperative and non-cooperative cases, defined in (25) and (23),
respectively, are as follows
φ2 = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α [(1+σ)
1
α +(1+σ(1−α)) 1α 1−ασ1+σ(1−α) ],
P({2}) = α(m1+m21−α )1−
1
α (σeu)
1
α [(1+σ(1−α)) 1α ].
Again we consider the ratio φ2P({2}) =
1
2 [(
1+σ
1+σ(1−α) )
1
α + 1−ασ1+σ(1−α) ] =
1
2 [(
1+σ−ασ+ασ
1+σ−ασ )
1
α + 1−ασ1+σ(1−α) ]. Applying
the generalized form of Bernoulli’s inequality, we have φ2P({2}) ≥ 12 [(1+ σ1+σ−ασ )+ 1−ασ1+σ(1−α) ] = 1.
Hence, when σcpσeu ≤
pcp
peu
, we have φ1 ≥ P({1}) and φ2 ≥ P({2}), implying both ISPs gain higher revenue
when they cooperate.
For case 2, pcppeu <
σcp
σeu ≤ α +
pcp
peu
, we have the same profits φi and P({i}) as in Case 1. Hence, using
the above method we can easily prove that φ1 ≥ P({1}) and φ2 ≥ P({2}).
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(a) CP (b) ISP2 with σcp = 2,σeu = 1
Figure 2: Payoff changes of CP and ISP2 when α = 0.5.
For case 3, σcpσeu > α +
pcp
peu
, ISP1’s profits in cooperative and non-cooperative models, defined in (25)
and (23), respectively, are as follows
φ1 = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α [(σ +1−α) 1α − (1+ k(1−α)) 1α 1−αk1+k(1−α) ],
P({1}) = α(m1+m21−α )1−
1
α (σeu)
1
α [(1+ k(1−α)) 1α k1+k(1−α) ].
Hence, the ratio is φ1P({1}) =
1
2 [
1+k(1−α)
k (
1+k
1+k(1−α))
1
α − 1−αkk ]. Applying the generalized form of Bernoulli’s
inequality, we can obtain φ1P({1}) ≥ 12 [1+k(1−α)k (1+ k1+k(1−α))− 1−αkk ] = 2k2k = 1.
Similarly, for ISP2 we have
φ2 = α(m1+m21−α )
1− 1α (σeu)
1
α [(σ +1−α) 1α +(1+ k(1−α)) 1α 1−αk1+k(1−α) ],
P({2}) = α(m1+m21−α )1−
1
α (σeu)
1
α [(1+ k(1−α)) 1α ].
Hence, the ratio is φ2P({2}) =
1
2 [(
σ+1−α
1+k(1−α))
1
α + 1−αk1+k(1−α) ] =
1
2 [(
1+k
1+k−αk )
1
α + 1−αk1+k(1−α) ]. Applying the gener-
alized form of Bernoulli’s inequality, we can obtain φ2P({2}) ≥ 12 [(1+ k1+k(1−α))+ 1−αk1+k(1−α) ] = 2(1+k(1−α))2(1+k(1−α)) =
1.
Thus, for all regions specified in (17) we have φi ≥ P({i}), i.e., an ISPi’s revenue portion in cooperative
model is at least equals to the revenue gained in non-cooperative model.
VI Numerical Simulations
We verify our analytical results through numerical simulations. We consider one CP, one EU, and
two ISPs as shown in Figure 1, and assume that CP and the EU share the same utility-level function
αeu = αcp = α ∈ (0,1). Figure 2a shows that, if σ(= σcpσeu )> α+ p(=
pcp
peu
), CP has the maximum profit
at σ = 0.4 and thus has incentive to invest in sponsored data plan. It implies that when CP has a higher
utility level than EU (or similarly, when the price charged to CP is relatively lower than the price charged
to EU), CP is willing to provide a higher sponsorship rate. In contrast, when σ ≤ α+ p, the maximum
payoff is achieved at s∗ = 0, i.e., the best strategy of CP is not sponsoring.
Next we observe the payoff of ISP2 as we change the price per unit traffic peu that charges to EU .
Figure 2b illustrates the results and show that the payoff of ISP2 linearly rises till some point, and then
declines exponentially, which is due to the fact that the demand of users is inversely proportional to
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(a) peu = 4, α = 0.3 (b) pcp = 2, α = 0.3
(c) pcp = 2, peu = 2 (d) peu = 4, α = 0.3
Figure 3: The optimal sponsoring rate with respect to pcp, peu, σ , and ptr.
peu. Although ISP2 obtains its revenue from charging ISP1 with transit-price ptr, the results show that
increasing the ptr does not necessarily increase the payoff of ISP2. As the transit price becomes higher,
CP is forced to increase pcp which in turn results in a decline of the traffic demand. Hence, the maximum
point is achieved at ptr = 1 and peu = 2.
We examine the impact of ISP prices (pcp, peu, and ptr) and σ on the optimal sponsoring rate with
different parameter sets. Figure 3a shows that as pcp increases, the sponsoring rate drops sharply. The
decreasing rate can be mitigated with higher σ . Figure 3b shows that with the increase of peu, the
marginal increase of the sponsoring rate is decreasing. Moreover, a larger σ value indicates a higher and
rapidly growing sponsorship rate. Figure 3c demonstrates the change of the optimal sponsoring rate with
respect to σ under different α values. The sponsorship rate logarithmically increases as σ increases. It
can be explained from the fact that CP with higher revenue level can afford more investment on the
sponsoring content. We can also observe that the variation in α has a little impact on the traffic demand.
Figure 3d will help us to understand the effect of the transit cost ptr to the optimal sponsoring rate s∗.
We can observe that the increase of the transit cost results in a sharp drop of s∗. The rise of transit cost
will incur significant loss in ISP1’s revenue, which forces ISP1 to increase its charge to CP, resulting in
a rapid drop of the sponsoring rate.
We now observe the total payoff of ISPs in cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Figure 4a il-
lustrates the results and show that the ISPs obtain higher total payoff when they collaborate. We also
examine the impact of collaboration on the individual payoff of ISP1 and ISP2. Figure 4b and 4c shows
that each ISP’s revenue portion in cooperative case increases sharply and highly exceeds the revenue
gained without collaboration.
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(a) Total payoff of ISPs (b) ISP1 (c) ISP2
Figure 4: Payoff changes of ISP1 and ISP2 when α = 0.5.
VII Conclusion
In this work, we studied the inter-pricing among ISPs that jointly deliver the sponsored data from CP
to EU. We derived the best response of the EU, the CP, and the ISPs, and analyzed their implications
for the sponsoring strategy of the CP. We investigate the interactions between strategic EU, CP, and two
interconnected ISPs through a sequential Stackelberg game, and verify our results through numerical
simulations. Our results clarify the high impact of the transit price of intermediate ISP on the sponsoring
strategies of the CP, and demonstrate in what scenarios sponsoring helps. The proposed model assists
CPs to make decision on offering content sponsoring services and ISPs to make appropriate pricing
scheme. We then study the effect of cooperation between the ISPs and show that the collaboration can
improve the total payoff of the ISPs and leads to a higher social welfare. Based on the Shapley value
mechanism, we further show that each ISP’s revenue portion in cooperative case exceeds the revenue
gained without collaboration. In our future work, we will consider the network with multiple ISPs for
the service to the EU or the CP which may result in competition between the ISPs and change the system
dynamics.
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